Does poverty lead to crime? We shed light on this question using two independent and exogenous shocks to household income in rural India: the dramatic reduction in import tariffs in the early 1990s and rainfall variations. We find that trade shocks, previously shown to raise relative poverty, also increased the incidence of violent crimes and property crimes. The relationship between trade shocks and crime is similar to the observed relationship between rainfall shocks and crime.
Introduction
The recent interest in climate change has spurred a large body of literature examining how climate influences human behavior, particularly human conflict.
Synthesizing this rapidly growing literature, Hsiang, Burke and Miguel (2013) establish that across all major world regions, and time periods extending from 10,000 BCE to the present day, rainfall and temperature patterns have a significant influence on the risk of human conflict. Deviations from normal in precipitation and air temperature raise the likelihood of violent crimes (such as murders), intergroup conflict (such as riots and rebellions), political violence, civil war onset, and even institutional breakdowns.
While the link between climate and human conflict is well established, we still do not fully understand the mechanisms that underlie the observed association. As discussed by Hsiang, Burke and Miguel (2013) , the most commonly hypothesized channel is the income channel. In agrarian economies, precipitation is one of the most important determinants of household wellbeing (see Dell et. al., 2014, for example) . Severe rainfall shortages cause economic productivity to decline, and the resulting decline in income could increase the value of criminal activities as an alternative source of income. Alternatively, the economic decline could undermine the ability of government institutions to monitor and curtail criminal activity, or reduce the ability of people to protect themselves against crime. This line of thought, which has permeated the large body of literature that uses weather shocks as an instrument for income, 1 3 explicitly assumes that rainfall's only influence on crime or conflict is through its effect on average income and poverty. However, this may not be the case.
Several psychological studies have documented a direct link between temperature changes and aggressive or violent behavior, without any changes to income.
2 Analysis of U.S. data at the monthly level also shows a strong link between rising temperatures and increases in crime (Ranson, 2014) . Alternatively, large climatic events could also lead to the dislocation of the population or faster urbanization of certain areas, which could in turn exacerbate frictions and conflict over existing resources. Rogall and Guariso (2013) find that heavy rainfall reduces conflict by hindering the movement of armed forces.
In this paper, we shed light on the mechanisms underlying the observed relationship between rainfall and crime. Using four decades of district level data from India, we first establish a robust effect of rainfall shocks on different types of crime, with the strongest effects on violent crimes (including murder) and property crimes. 3 We then go beyond previous studies, which simply document the link between weather variations and human conflict, and examine to what extent poverty is the main causal pathway between rainfall shocks and crime. 4 To this end, we identify an additional source of exogenous income shocks for households in rural India that is completely independent of the amount of rainfall, namely trade liberalization. Starting in 1991, India enacted a series of dramatic trade reforms following a balance of payments crisis and a subsequent IMF bailout package. Previous studies (Topalova, 2007 (Topalova, , 2010 have established that these trade reforms had a significant impact on regional economic outcomes.
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Districts that were more exposed to trade liberalization through their pre-reform employment mix experienced slower progress in poverty reduction and slower economic growth. We examine whether these districts differed in the incidence of various types of crime as a result of the trade reform.
We find that violent crimes and property crimes, the types of criminal activities that are most sensitive to rainfall shocks, indeed respond to trade shocks.
The larger the loss in trade protection a district experienced, the higher is the incidence of these crimes. And just as in the case with rainfall shocks, trade shocks do not seem to affect crimes against public order or crimes against women.
The similarity in patterns of how criminal behavior responds to two very different sources of variation in poverty and income suggests that the income channel is the most relevant mechanism behind the observed rainfall-crime relationship.
We compute the implied elasticity of crime to poverty and income shocks using both of these determinants of rural well-being. If the income channel is the primary mechanism through which weather and trade shocks affect crime, we expect to see similar estimated elasticities regardless of whether we use trade shocks or rainfall shocks as an instrument for income. We instead find that the estimated elasticities depend on the proxies used for measuring income. When we use per capita consumption as the measure of income, the estimated income-crime relationship is larger when using the rainfall instrument. When we use poverty (head count ratio or poverty gap) as the measure of income, the estimated incomecrime relationship is larger when using the trade shocks instrument. This can be explained by the fact that rainfall shocks affect consumption throughout the income distribution, while trade shocks predominantly affect the consumption of households in the lower deciles of income, a pattern we verify empirically.
Finally, we examine whether policy measures to weaken the rainfallincome relationship also attenuate the rainfall-crime relationship. We focus on two such policy measures in the Indian context. The first is India's biggest social 5 insurance scheme: the nationwide workfare program created by the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which guarantees a hundred days of minimum-wage employment to every rural household. The program was rolled out in three phases over 2006-2008, enabling us to examine whether the rainfallcrime relationship is weaker after the implementation of this program. We do not find any such attenuation of the rainfall-crime relationship, possibly because the program may not have been able to offset the sensitivity of consumption to weather patterns.
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The second policy measure we examine is the construction of dams. While the presence of dams upstream from a district has been shown to insulate agricultural productivity from the vagaries of the weather, there is no statistically significant impact on the rainfall-poverty relationship (Duflo and Pande, 2007) .
Consistent with this, we also do not find any attenuation of the rainfall-crime relationship in places with or without upstream dams.
Our study thus makes three key contributions to the literature on the economic determinants of crime and conflict. We provide empirical evidence of the causal impact of trade or globalization on crime and conflict, on which there is little previous work. 6 Second, we provide evidence that income indeed is one of the main channels underlying the observed relationship between rainfall shocks and crime, lending credence to a vast literature that has so far assumed this must be the main channel. We also provide evidence on the causal effects of income 5 See, among others, Zimmermann (2013), Imbert and Papp (2013) and Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013) for analyses of the NREGA's effect on employment, rural wages and corruption. However, the lack of district-level annual data on per capita consumption or poverty rates makes it difficult to assess whether the program made a significant difference to the rainfall-poverty relationship. 6 Chua (2002) hypothesizes that a greater role of market forces in a democratic setting may sometimes result in ethnic or class conflict; Bezemer and Jong-a-pin (2013) provide cross-country empirical evidence in support of this argument. Prasad (2012) , on the other hand, argues that the dismantling of controls and protection accompanying economic liberalization would reduce the incentives for illegal trade which is often associated with violent crime. Using aggregate and statelevel data for India, he finds that homicides fell in the post-reform period. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and the construction of variables used in the analysis, and Section 3 lays out the empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes.
Weather, Trade and Crime in India: Data and Variable Construction

Crime
We obtained district level data on crime from India's National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) for the period 1971-2010. These are data for the number of crimes reported in each district annually, and are provided for many different crime categories. We combined individual crime categories into five broad categories: violent interpersonal crimes (murder, culpable homicide, attempted murder, assault, kidnapping), property crimes (armed robbery, robbery, burglary, theft), economic crimes (breach of trust, cheating, counterfeiting), crimes against public order (riots, arson) and crimes against women (rape, sexual harassment, dowry deaths, kidnapping of women, cruelty by husband or relatives). Our 7 Many papers which examine the income-crime relationship do not use exogenous determinants of income, and the results can therefore be subject to issues of omitted variables bias or reverse causality (see, for example, Dreze and Khera, 2000) . In a developing country setting, using exogenous variation in income that stems from sources other than rainfall or commodity price shocks is very rare. Fafchamps and Minten (2006) is a notable exception in this regard. 8 Previous work that focuses on religious violence in India, such as Mitra and Ray (2013) . Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) and Sarsons (2011) , use the Varshney and Wilkinson (2004) data set, which contains data until 1995. Our paper uses an updated data set with data until 2010.
preferred measures of crime intensity are computed as the log of the number of crimes per capita. NCRB provides the data at the level of the police district.
We aggregate our crime variables to the level of the administrative district, and further adjust for splits in administrative districts over time. 9 We restrict our analysis to the 16 major states. Soares (2002) finds that crime reporting rates are strongly correlated with economic development. If this pattern exists in the case of India, and negative income shocks cause households to underreport crime, our estimates would underestimate the true causal impact of poverty on crime. Iyer et. al. (2012) show that political empowerment of women leads to greater reporting of crimes against women.
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Data on rainfall and temperature were obtained from the University of Delaware website, 13 and matched to the centroids of the 2001 administrative district boundaries following Cole et. al. (2012) . 14 Our main measure of rainfall is simply the logarithm of the total annual rainfall in a district, measured in millimeters as in Brückner and Ciccone (2011) . Since there are many ways to parameterize rainfall, we also examine a non-linear specification. For this, we define a "negative rainfall shock" as a dummy which takes the value of 1 when annual rainfall in a district is one standard deviation below the long-run mean rainfall level, and a "positive rainfall shock" as the occurrence of rainfall one standard deviation above the long-run mean. This is similar to the measure used in Cole et. al. (2012) . While excessively high rainfall might result in floods and thereby also decrease agricultural productivity or incomes, in the Indian context more rainfall appears to be only beneficial, a relationship also established by Duflo and Pande (2007) .
Several recent papers have focused on the impact of temperature changes on economic production in a cross-country setting (Dell et. al., 2012 (Dell et. al., , 2014 Prior work has demonstrated that districts which experienced larger reduction in trade protection had substantially slower income growth, poverty decline, and schooling increases (Topalova 2007 , Topalova, 2010 , Edmonds et. al., 2010 . These differential exposures to tariff reductions can be considered exogenous shocks to per capita income or poverty levels at the district level, and can be exploited to see if they also result in changes in crime rates. 1991 where i indexes a specific industry. The above measure takes into account employment in traded and non-traded industries such as services, trade, transportation, construction and growing of cereals and oilseeds within a district.
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Non-traded industries are assigned zero tariffs in all years. Therefore a large part of the variation in this measure of district tariffs is driven by the variation in the share of the non-traded sector across districts. To capture purely the policy-driven 17 In treating the district as the relevant unit of analysis, we are following convention in the micro empirical literature on India (see Banerjee and Iyer, 2005 , Cole et. al., 2012 , Duflo and Pande, 2007 and Jayachandran, 2006 . Using district level data, rather than state level, enables us to compute local level shocks to economic activity. The non-availability of crime data below district level prevents us from a further disaggregated analysis. 18 Topalova (2010) argues that the latter two categories should be treated as non-traded because all product lines within cereals and oilseeds were canalized (i.e. imports were allowed only by the state trading monopoly) and the tariffs on all product lines under the growing of cereals are zero until 2000. In the 2000s, the non-tariff barriers for these products were slowly reduced, while the tariffs were raised. This change in policies was not accompanied by a change in the actual imports of these goods. For consistency with the earlier period, we continue to treat these products as nontraded. The most dramatic period of trade reform was during the Eighth Plan (1992-97); this is also a period in which there appears to be no systematic pattern between tariff changes and pre-reform industry characteristics, such as productivity or industry size (Topalova, 2007) . India remained committed to further trade liberalization after 1997 as well, and import tariffs continued to decline. However, at the time the government announced the export-import policy in the Ninth Plan (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , the pressure for further reforms from external sources (like the IMF) had abated. Since variation in tariffs in this later period may reflect various political economy factors (see Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) , our primary period for analysis is 1988-1997, over which tariff reductions can be considered exogenous. We also show results for the full time period for which we can construct district-level employment weighted tariffs , though these results may be subject to a greater degree of endogeneity in the tariff measure. Similarly, when we examine the effect of rainfall and temperature on crime, we will show results for the 1988-1997 period to match the period of 12 exogenous trade reforms, as well as the full period for which weather and crime data are available, 1970-2010.
We should note that trade shocks and rainfall shocks are very weakly correlated in our data. The observed correlation of rainfall and tariff levels for the 1988-1997 period was 0.24; the correlation of rainfall and the more policy-driven traded tariff levels was only -0.03.
Income and Poverty
Data on per capita income, poverty or GDP are scarce at the district level in India. 20 We use the National Sample Surveys from 1983, 1987-88, 1993-94 and 1999-00 to compute district level estimates of per capita consumption and poverty in the rural sector. 21 We construct two measures of poverty. The head count ratio, defined as the fraction of the population whose annual consumption is below the poverty line, captures the incidence of poverty, and the poverty gap, defined as the average distance of the poor from the poverty line, captures the depth of poverty. When we examine the links between weather and income/poverty, we use all years for which outcome data are available. However, when we present evidence on the effects of trade liberalization on income/poverty, we focus only on the long difference, i.e. the data from 1987 and 1999 NSS rounds, since 1993 is right in the middle of the trade reforms.
20 Data on per capita GDP at the district level for 1999-2006 were collected by the Planning Commission of India. However, since these data do not cover the period during which trade shocks can be viewed as exogenous, we do not use them in our paper. 21 We correct consumption data from the 1999-2000 round for the change in the survey design following Deaton (2003a) and use the poverty lines and price indices proposed by Deaton (2003b) to compute real expenditure and poverty incidence. See Topalova (2007) for more detail. Given the NSS sampling methodology in urban areas, it is not possible to create representative aggregates at the district level in urban India. In 2001, 71.5% of India's population lived in rural areas.
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Income Shock Mitigators
In 2005 documented that NREGA provided alternative sources of employment during periods of poor rainfall (Zimmermann, 2013) , and led to a significant rise in rural wages (Imbert and Papp, 2013) , despite the existence of considerable corruption and leakage in its administration (Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2012) . This suggests that the implementation of this program is likely to weaken the relationship between rainfall and poverty. If the rainfall-crime relationship is primarily driven by the income channel, we might expect this program to also attenuate the rainfall-crime relationship. We obtained the year the NREGA program was rolled out in each district from the Planning Commission of India.
In a similar vein, the presence of dams upstream from a district has been shown to reduce the impact of rainfall on agricultural productivity (Duflo and Pande, 2007) . We can therefore check if the presence of upstream dams also reduces the link between rainfall shocks and crime, using data on the presence of dams in each district from Duflo and Pande (2007) , for the period 1970-2000.
Other Variables
We obtain census data on demographic variables such as literacy rates, sex ratios, urbanization, the fraction of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 22 
Empirical Strategy
Our analysis exploits the detailed district panel data that we have constructed on the incidence of various types of crime, rainfall and temperature for the 1970-2010 period, trade shocks for the 1987-2010 period, and poverty and consumption for 1983, 1987, 1993-94 and 1999-2000 . Our goal is to examine the link between income shocks and crime, by focusing on two very different sources of exogenous variation in household income in rural India: weather shocks and trade shocks.
We first establish that these shocks do indeed significantly affect measured poverty rates and per capita expenditures, using the sparse household consumption data available. We then examine the reduced form relationship between the two types of shocks and criminal activity. If income is the main driving force behind the link between rainfall shortfalls and trade liberalization and crime, we should expect to see the implied elasticity of crime to poverty and consumption to be roughly similar when using these two disparate sources of income fluctuations.
To that purpose, we first establish the causal effect of weather shocks and trade shocks on per capita consumption and poverty levels. We examine the effect of trade shocks on poverty levels, using a very similar specification to (1) above, following Topalova (2010) and TrTariff dst may be systematically correlated with unobserved time-varying district-specific factors that also have a bearing on the district's poverty and consumption. As discussed in Topalova (2010) , one way to address this concern is to allow the initial sectoral composition and other pre-reform district characteristics that may affect its future growth to have a time varying effect.
Hence, X ds0 includes the district's employment composition at a more aggregate level than the one used in the construction of the Tariff dst (namely the share of workers in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, trade, transport and services), the literacy rate, and the population share of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes prior to the reforms. These characteristics are interacted with a post-liberalization indicator (which in this two period framework is equivalent to the year fixed effects, β t ).
We examine the "reduced form" impact of weather and trade shocks on crime using the same regression specifications as above, namely: where Crime dst is measured as the log of the number of crimes per capita for each crime category. Unlike the "first stage" regressions, which rely on poverty and consumption data available only at five-year intervals, regressions (3) and (4) 
Empirical Results
Rainfall Shocks, Trade Shocks and Income
Consistent with many previous cross-country and India-specific studies, we find that rainfall is a significant determinant of per capita income and poverty. A one standard deviation increase in log rainfall (0.54) is associated with 1.24%
higher per capita consumption, a 4.5 percentage point reduction in the head count ratio and 1.6 percentage point reduction in the poverty gap (Table 2 , panel A, columns 1-3). In contrast to cross-country studies, we find that higher temperatures have no significant effect on per capita consumption or poverty measures. Consistent with this insignificant effect of temperature, the effects of rainfall on consumption and poverty remain very similar if we exclude temperature from our regressions (Table 2 , panel A, columns 4-6).
Despite the possibility that high rainfall might have detrimental effects due to flooding or destruction of crops, we find that positive rainfall shocks are associated with higher consumption and lower poverty in the Indian context, while negative rainfall shocks are associated with lower consumption and higher poverty (Table A .1, Panel A). In other words, we do not find any evidence of a non-linear relationship between rainfall and poverty, providing support for our use of rainfall levels as the main measure of rainfall variation. As before, temperature does not significantly predict consumption or poverty. There is also no non-linear effect on temperature when using the "harmful" degree-months measure of temperature variations ( 
Rainfall Shocks and Crime
We find that higher rainfall is associated with significantly lower levels of crime (Table 3 , panel A). A one standard deviation increase in log rainfall is associated with 3.6% lower total crimes per capita. This decrease is primarily driven by decreases in violent interpersonal crimes (4.2% decline), property crimes (2.2% decline) and economic crimes (3.8% decline). We do not find significant effects of higher rainfall on crimes against public order or crimes against women. The impact of rainfall on violent crimes and property crimes remains statistically significant when our estimation sample is extended to the longer time period of 1970-2010, though the magnitude of the coefficients falls (Table 3 , panel B). In a robustness check, we verify that the effects of rainfall on crime categories remain very similar if we exclude temperature from our regressions (Table A. 2, panels A and B).
Examining individual crime categories, we find that higher rainfall is associated with lower rates of murder and rape (Table 4 , panels A and B). The impact on theft is statistically significant only in the restricted sample ( (Table 4 , panels A and B). Nevertheless, the broad pattern of higher rainfall being associated with lower crimes, in several different crime categories, is present.
While the effects of rainfall are consistent with the income hypothesis, two pieces of evidence suggest that other factors may also be at work. First, higher average temperatures are associated with higher crimes against public order and crimes against women, particularly rape, in the longer sample period (Tables 3   and 4 , panel B), even though temperature variations are not predictive of variations in consumption or poverty. Second, property crimes display a nonlinear relationship with rainfall, even though consumption and poverty do not.
Property crimes are significantly higher when rainfall is both one standard deviation lower and one standard deviation higher than the long-run average (Table A. 2, panel C, column 3).
Trade Shocks and Crime
The relationship between trade shocks and crime rates is very similar to that between rainfall shocks and crime. Districts which were not as exposed to the reduction in trade protection because of their initial employment mix, and hence experienced relatively faster reduction in poverty, have lower levels of crime. A one standard deviation increase in average district tariffs results in 2.4% lower total crimes per capita (Table 5 , panel A). Very similar to the pattern with rainfall shocks, this decline is driven primarily by a decline in violent interpersonal crimes (2.7% decline), property crimes (3.1% decline) and economic crimes (6.1% decline), and there is no statistically significant impact on crimes against public order or crimes against women. (Table 6 ). As a robustness check, we also show that the results are not dependent on instrumenting for tariff levels with initial tariffs and traded tariff levels. The relationship between tariff levels and crime rates is very similar in the OLS specification as well (Table A. 3).
Comparing the Effects of Rainfall and Trade Exposure on Crime
While trade shocks and rainfall shocks appear to influence crime rates in a similar direction (Tables 3 and 5) , are the magnitudes of these effects comparable? This is important in assessing whether the mechanism through which these effects operate is predominantly shocks to income or poverty. As described earlier, the lack of annual panel data on income or poverty rates at the district level prevents us from directly computing instrumental variable estimates using these different sets of exogenous shocks to income and comparing the resulting magnitudes. However, we can compute the "implied" instrumental variable estimate by dividing the estimated effects of rainfall and trade on crime rates (the "reduced form") by the estimated effects of rainfall and trade on consumption and poverty (the "first stage").
If income or poverty is the main mechanism of influence, we should find similar "implied IV" effects, regardless of whether we use rainfall shocks or trade shocks as the instrumental variable. Given that trade shocks are of a more permanent nature than rainfall shocks, we might also find that the effects on crime using trade shocks are larger than using income shocks. Table 7 In sum, comparing the magnitude of the impact of rainfall and trade shocks on crime provides further evidence that the primary channel of influence is through changes in consumption or poverty. The differential patterns when using average consumption versus poverty levels are explained by the differential effects of rainfall shocks and trade shocks on different parts of the income distribution.
Mitigating the Effect of Rainfall on Income
A further way to corroborate the role of poverty is to examine two features of the institutional landscape which might help in mitigating the impact of rainfall shocks on consumption-the implementation of the social safety net in the form of the NREGA workfare program, and the building of dams. We extend our regression specification to include interaction terms as follows: 
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We find that neither of these policy-driven interventions appears to have a strong moderating effect on the relationship between rainfall shocks and crime.
When estimating specification (5), we find no significant differences between the effects of rainfall shocks before and after NREGA is implemented (Table 8, panel A). In fact, the estimated interaction coefficient m 1 is consistently negative (though insignificant) for all crime categories, suggesting no mitigating effect of this policy intervention.
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The presence of dams also does not mitigate the effects of rainfall shocks on crime. Previous work has demonstrated that the presence of dams in an upstream district dampens the effect of rainfall shocks on productivity (Duflo and Pande 2007) . However, it appears that crime in districts downstream of dams is just as likely to respond to rainfall shocks as crime in districts that do not benefit from the presence of dam. 25 The estimated interaction coefficients g 1 are mostly negative in sign though statistically indistinguishable from zero (Table 8 , panel B).
One possible explanation for why these policy measures do not dampen the rainfall-crime relationship could be because they do not have a large impact on the rainfall-poverty or rainfall-consumption relationship. Indeed, when we examine whether income and poverty are as sensitive to rainfall in districts that are downstream to dams, we do not find strong evidence that income and poverty are insulated from variations in weather in these areas. As demonstrated in Table   A .5, the coefficients on the interaction of rainfall levels and an indicator for the presence of a dam in an upstream district are negative, but not statistically 24 Our results on crime are in contrast to the findings of Fetzer (2013) , who finds a mitigating effect of NREGA implementation on violence in insurgency-affected areas. 25 Sarsons (2011) finds a similar pattern when examining the role of rainfall shocks on religious violence. However, Hindu-Muslim riots in India are predominantly an urban phenomenon (Varshney, 2002) , while dams are more likely to act as an income-smoothing device in rural areas, suggesting that the Sarsons (2011) analysis may not be particularly relevant to test the income channel for this specific crime category. 24 significant. 26 Our results on the non-impact of the NREGA program is somewhat surprising in light of other studies which document that NREGA presence completely offsets the rainfall dependence of agricultural wages (Fetzer, 2013) or reduces the impact of droughts on child stunting by three-quarters (Dasgupta, 2013) . In related regressions, we have also verified that the effect of rainfall shocks on crime rates does not vary significantly across districts with more or fewer people employed in farming (results not shown).
Conclusions
Using variation in per capita consumption and poverty generated by differential exposure of different regions in India to the trade liberalization process of the 1990s, we examine whether the income channel is the primary driver of the observed relationship between rainfall shocks and crime. We analyze a wide range of crime categories over a period of several decades. Our evidence provides strong support for the income channel. Violent crimes and property crimes rise during periods of low rainfall and/or higher exposure to foreign competition, while other crime categories such as crimes against women do not show a strong relationship with either of these exogenous income shifters. Our results are novel in providing evidence for the income mechanism behind the observed rainfall-crime relationship, which has mostly been assumed in the prior literature.
We also find several other interesting results which are important in understanding the relationship between economic shocks, climate variation and Note: All summary statistics are from India's 16 major states. Crime variables are measured as the log of number of crimes per capita. Rain is the precipitation in a district in units of 100 mn per year. Temperature is the average air temperature in degrees Celsius. Tariff is the employment weighted district tariff as in Topalova (2007 Topalova ( , 2010 . Negative rainfall shock is an indicator equal to 1 if rainfall is more than one standard deviation below the historical averge district rainfall. Positive rainfall shock is an indicator equal to 1 if rainfall is more than one standard deviation above the historical average district rainfall. Ratio Poverty Gap Poverty Gap *** Significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent level. Notes: All specifications use district-level data from India's 16 major states and include district, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the district level. All crime variables are measured as the log of number of crimes per capita. Rain is the precipitation in a district in units of 100 mm per year. Temperature is the average air temperature in degrees Celsius. All regressions control for state-specific time trends, percent of population that is rural, literacy rate, sex ratio, percent of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe population and percent farmers. Hindu-Muslim Riots *** Significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent level.
IV OLS
Notes: All specifications use district-level data from India's 16 major states and include district, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the district level. All crime variables are measured as the log of number of crimes per capita. Tariff is the employment weighted district tariff instrumented by traded employment weighttariffs and the initial tariff interacted with the year indicators. All regressions control for state-specific time trends, and the initial literacy rate, percent of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe population and initial district industrial structure interacted with a post reform indicator. *** Significant at 1 percent level; ** significant at 5 percent level; * significant at 10 percent level.
Log Mean Consumption Head Count Ratio
Notes: All specifications use district-level data from India's 16 major states and include district and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the district level. Data are from the years 1973, 1983, 1987, 1993 and 1999 . Rain is the precipitation in a district in units of 100 mm per year. Temperature variation is the "cumulative number of degrees-times-months that exceed 32 C in a district and year". Negative rainfall shock is an indicator equal to 1 if rainfall is more than one standard deviation below the averge district rainfall. Positive rainfall shock is an indicator equal to 1 if rainfall is more than one standard deviation above the average district rainfall. Temperature is the average air temperature in degrees Celsius. Regressions control for percent of population that is rural, literacy rate, sex ratio, percent of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe population and percent farmers. 1973, 1983, 1987, 1993 and 1999 . Rain is the precipitation in a district in units of 100 mm per year. Data on upstream dams is from Duflo and Pande (2007) . Regressions control for percent of population that is rural, literacy rate, sex ratio, percent of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe population and percent farmers.
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